(i) it is strong key-insulated; (ii) it is provably secure without random oracles.
Introduction
In 1984, Shamir [1] introduced an innovative concept called identity-based cryptography. In such a cryptosystem, user's public key is determined as his identity such as e-mail address, while the corresponding secret key is generated by a private key generator (PKG) according to this identity. Since the identity is a natural link to a user, there is no need to bind it by a digital certificate. Thus it can successfully eliminate the need for certificates as used in traditional public key infrastructures. So far, a large number of identity-based signature (IBS) schemes have been proposed. Standard IBS schemes rely on the assumption that secret keys are kept perfectly secure. However, as more and more cryptographic primitives are applied to insecure environments (e.g. mobile devices), the problem of key-exposure seems inevitable. This problem is perhaps the most devastating attack on a cryptosystem, since it typically means that security is entirely lost.
To deal with the key-exposure problem, key-evolving protocols have been introduced. This mechanism includes forward security [2, 3] , intrusion-resilience [4] and key-insulation [5] . The latter was introduced by Dodis, et al. [5] in Eurocrypt'02. In this model, a physically-secure but computationally-limited device, named the base or helper, is involved. The full-fledged secret key is divided into two parts: a helper key and an initial temporary secret key. The former is stored in the helper, and the latter is kept by the user. The lifetime of the system is divided into discrete periods. The public key remains unchanged throughout the lifetime, while temporary secret keys are updated periodically: at the beginning of each period, the user obtains from the helper an update key for the current period; combining this update key with the temporary secret key for the previous period, he can derive the temporary secret key for the current period. A temporary secret key is used to sign a message during the corresponding period without further access to the physically secure device. Exposure of the temporary secret key at a given period will not enable an adversary to derive temporary secret keys for the remaining periods. Therefore, this mechanism can minimize the damage caused by key-exposure. More precisely, in a (l,N)-key-insulated scheme, the compromise of temporary secret keys for up to l periods does not expose temporary secret keys for any of the remaining N−l periods. Therefore, the public key needs not to be revoked unless up to l periods have been exposed.
A scheme is called perfectly key-insulated if it is (N−1,N)-key-insulated. This is a desirable property for dealing with the key-exposure problem in ID-based cryptosystems. Additionally, strong key-insulated security guarantees that the helper (or an attacker compromising the helper key) is unable to derive the temporary secret key for any period. This is an extremely important property if the helper serves several different users or the helper is untrustworthy.
Following the pioneering work due to Dodis, et al. [5] , several key-insulated encryption schemes including some ID-based key-insulated encryption ones have been proposed [6−11] . Following Dodis, et al.'s first key-insulated signature schemes [12] , efforts have also been devoted to the key-insulated signatures, e.g. Ref. [13−16] . To minimize the damage caused by key-exposure in IBS scenarios, Zhou, et al. [17] applied the key-insulation mechanism to IBS and proposed the first ID-based key-insulated signature (IBKIS) scheme (ZCC scheme). However, the full-fledged secret key in ZCC scheme is just wholly stored in the helper. Consequently, it can not satisfy the strong key-insulated security. That is, if an adversary compromises a user's helper, he can derive all the temporary secret keys of this user. Moreover, ZCC scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model. As pointed out in Ref. [18] , a proof in the random oracle model can only serve as a heuristic argument since it can not imply the security in the real world.
In this paper, we re-formalize the definition and security notions for IBKIS schemes, and then propose a new IBKIS scheme which is strongly key-insulated and provably secure without random oracles. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an introduction to bilinear pairings and the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. We re-formalize the definition and security notions for IBKIS schemes in Section 3. Our new IBKIS scheme is proposed in Section 4. In Section 5, we prove the security of our scheme in the standard model. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
, where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by A.
Definition 2.
We say that the (t,ε)-CDH assumption holds in group G 1 , if no t-time adversary A has advantage at least ε in solving the CDH problem in G 1 . ← .
• Sign(t,m,TSK ID,t ): The signing algorithm, taking as input a period index t, a message m and the temporary secret key TSK ID,t , returns a pair (t,σ) composed of the period index t and a signature σ. We write (t,σ)=Sign(t,m,TSK ID,t ). Note that there exist only five algorithms in Zhou, et al.'s definition [17] for IBKIS. In fact, their definition does = not include the key-update algorithm of the signer, and the full-fledged secret key simply acts as the helper key and is wholly stored in the helper. Obviously, schemes satisfying their definition can not achieve strong key-insulated security.
Security notions for IBKIS
Dodis, et al. [12] formalized the security notions of key-insulation, strong key-insulation and secure key-updates for key-insulated signatures. In this section, we also formalize these security notions for IBKIS schemes. Note that Zhou, et al. [17] did not consider notions of strong key-insulation and secure key-updates.
Before giving these security notions for IBKIS schemes, we consider the following oracles which together model the abilities of an adversary: 
Definition 4.
Let Π=(Setup,Extract,UpdH,UpdS,Sign,Verify) be an IBKIS scheme. We define the advantage of an adversary A as It is possible for an adversary to compromise the physically-secure helpers (this includes the attacks by the helpers themselves, in case they are untrustworthy). Zhou, et al. [17] did not address this kind of attack. Here, we model this attack by allowing the adversary to query oracle HKO(⋅) on any identity (even including the challenged identity). However, as in Ref. [12] , the adversary is prohibited to query oracle TKO(⋅,⋅) on the challenged identity for any period. Moreover, since oracle TKO(⋅,⋅) is of no help for those non-challenged identities, we do not provide it for adversary A in the following definition. 
Our Proposed Scheme
Based on Paterson-Schuldt's IBS scheme [20] , which is based on Water's ID-based encryption scheme [21] , we propose a new IBKIS scheme in this section.
Construction
Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups with prime order q of size k, g be a random generator of G 1 , and be a bilinear ê map such that . Let and be two collision-resistant hash functions for some n u , n m ∈Z. Let F be a pseudo random function (PRF) [22] such that given a k-bit seed s and a k-bit argument x, it outputs a k-bit string F s (x). The proposed IBKIS scheme consists of the following six algorithms:
Setup: Given a security parameter k, PKG first picks 
For easy explanation, we define two functions L 1 and L 2 such that 1 2( ) for any set {1,..., }; ( ) for any set {1,..., }. 
To make the notation easy to follow, hereafter, we use , ,
ID t ID
U U′ and M m to denote the following sets for a given identity ID, a period index t and a message m as follows. 
UpdS: Given a period index t 1 , an update key Note that for a given identity ID and a given period index t, the corresponding temporary secret key is always set to 
Verify: Given a purported signature σ=(t,V,R t ,R,R m ) on an identity ID and a message m, a verifier accepts σ iff.
the following equality holds
Correctness
The consistency of this scheme can be explained as follows: 
.
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Desirable properties
Our scheme supports unbounded number of time periods [6] , i.e., the the total number of periods, say N, is not involved in algorithm Setup. Algorithms UpdH and UpdS further show that our scheme supports random-access key-updates [6] , since one can update 
TSK
in one "step" for any time period indices t 1 , t 2 . In Section 5, we will prove that our scheme is perfectly key-insulated, strong key-insulated and has secure key-updates.
Security Analysis
In this section, to support our scheme, we will give its provable security in the standard model.
Theorem 1.
The proposed scheme is perfectly key-insulated in the standard model, assuming that (1) the CDH assumption holds in G 1 ; (2) the hash function H is collision-resistant; (3) the function F is a pseudo random function.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that the hash function H is collision-resistant and the function F is a pseudo random function, then given an adversary A that has advantage ε against the perfectly key-insulated security of our proposed scheme by running in time T, asking at most q k , q t and q s queries to oracles KEO(⋅), T T Ot nn n q t n nε ε
TKO(⋅,⋅) and SO(⋅,⋅,⋅)
where t e and t m denote the running time of an exponentiation and a multiplication in G 1 respectively.
We will show how to construct a (t′,ε′)-adversary B against the CDH assumption in group G 1 . On inputting 3 1 ( , , ) 
Then a set of public parameters defined below are passed to A To make the notation easy to follow, we also define four functions J 1 , J 2 , K 1 and K 2 such that for any set S⊆{1,…,n u } and S′⊆{1,…,n m },
Note that for any set S⊆{1,…,n u }, S′⊆{1,…,n m } the following equalities always hold
Before describing the simulation, we point out that some implicit relations exit in our scheme: according to Eq. (2), all the temporary secret keys of a given user share the same exponent r; and according to Eq. (4), all the signatures generated by a given signer also share the same exponent r. To embody these relations in the simulation, Oracle TKO(⋅) simulation: As argued in Remark 2, we require that A only queries oracle TKO(⋅) on the challenged identity. Upon receiving a temporary secret key query 〈ID,t〉, B outputs "failure" and aborts if 
Note that in both cases, it can be verified that TSK ID,t has the correct form as Eq.(2). 
Observe that σ is indeed a valid signature in all cases. 
does not hold (denote this event by E4). Otherwise 
Conclusions
With more and more cryptographic primitives applied to insecure environments such as mobile devices, key-exposure seems inevitable. This problem is perhaps the most dangerous attack on a cryptosystem since it typically means that security is entirely lost. To minimize the damage caused by key-exposure in ID-based signature scenarios, Zhou, et al. [17] adopted the key-insulation method and proposed an IBKIS scheme. However, their scheme is not strong key-insulated and their probably security is based on the random oracle model. In this paper,
we re-formalize the definition and security notions for IBKIS schemes, and then propose a new IBKIS scheme with strong key-insulated security. Moreover, our scheme is provably secure in the standard model without resorting to the random oracle methodology. This is an attractive property since a proof in the random oracle model can only serve as a heuristic argument and can not imply the security in the implementation.
